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TheStoicMethodofHappiness

Ian Blecher

ofman...
Leta stoicarisewhoshallrevealtheresources
- Emerson

1
- heldthat:
TheStoics- mostofthem,anyway1
(1) Virtueis thesolegood.
toothers.
someitemsarepreferable
(2) Outsidethescopeofvirtue,
From(1),and fromancientplatiNot,however,withoutdiscomfort.
tudesconnecting
goodnesswithhappiness,we mayinferthatvirtueis
butalso sufficient
forhappiness;and thattherefore
notonlynecessary,
happinessis alwayswithinreach,evenon therack(deFinIII 42; cf.EN
To be fair,theStoicsneverclaimedhappinessmustbe
1000b22-1101a8).
withthethoughtthat
alwayswithineasyreach;theywerecomfortable
onlySocratesand Cato theYounger- ifanyoneat all - had thestuff
- widespread,unfortuforit.2Butthiswillhardlyease theimpression
- thus,forexample,
nately thattheirsis a severeandjoylessdoctrine
Hegel,in thePhenomenology
ofSpirit:'Stoicismis thefreedomwhich

1 DiogenesLaertius
thatPanaetiusandPosidoniusreject(1) (DL VII 103,128).
reports
2 Fora discussionoftheproblems
see Inwood2005.
posedbythispossibility,
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158 Ian Blecher

out ofbondage[viz.,]freedomin thought... a
alwayscomesdirectly
truth
lackingthefullnessoflife'(§§ 199-200).3
In replyitmightbe observedthattheStoicsalso expoundeddoctrine
sufficient
concernfor'thefullness
oflife',for
(2);thattheydemonstrated
'theresourcesofman',justby rankingexternalgoods.But- ranking
? Itis notthatitis obviouslyincoherent
themaccording
towhat
toprefer
healthandwealthandrenown4
tosay,havingone'slimbstornfromtheir
It is thatthesensein whichsuch thingsare supposedto be
sockets.5
is difficult
to makeoutiftheyarenotsimplybetterthanthe
preferred
- if,thatis,theyareirrelevant
alternatives
tohappiness.Ifitis intellione
thiscan onlybe because
to
would
think,
gible prefersomething,
in
a
it
is
sense
different
fromthesensein
having good (thoughperhaps
iswhat
whichvirtueisgood)(deFinTV20-2,41,57-60).This,presumably,
areneeded
movesAristotle
tosaythatvirtueanditsmaterialconditions
fora happylife.
ButAristotle's
view is notwithoutproblems.6
The crassconclusion
thatanincreaseofwealthorotherso-calledexternal
goodshouldalways
cannot
be
avoided
once
somerolein the
causegreater
easily
happiness
In
itcannotbe
life
has
been
external
provided
goods. particular,
happy
to Aristotle
theviewthatonlythata minimum
avoidedby attributing
increasebeyondwhichdoesnot
standardofexternal
goodsis required,
makefora betterlife.7For thisis evidentlyto allow thatdecreaseof
external
goodsbelowthatpointmakesfora worselife:andthatAristotle
was unwillingto concede.'[T]hehappymancan neverbecomemiserofa hodgepodge:
able,'sayshe (EN llOlaó). Whatis leftis something
inlifedoesnotdependon [external
'Successorfailure
goods],buthuman
while
excellent
activities
or their
these
as
as
we
needs
well,
life,
said,
or
the
reverse'
what
determine
(EN 1100b9-ll).
happiness
oppositesare

3 Cf. also Diss 1 19.
4 For catalogs ofexternalgoods, see, e.g.,de Fin TV20, 49.
5 This is not,however,a unanimous opinion. For Pyrrho,Herillus of Carthage and
Aristoof Chios, among others,externalgoods simplydid not rate (de Fin II 35, 43;
IV 42f.;V 23; DL VÜ 160,165).
6 The positiondeveloped in thisparagraphcloselyfollowsthatofJuliaAnnas 1993,
364-84.
7 Cf. Annas 1993,382.
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This sounds somethinglike the Stoicview,actually:but ratherthan
followitthrough
tothelogical(thoughprunafacieunintuitive)
conclusionthatexternal
maintains
that
goodsarenot,afterall,good,Aristotle
humanlifeneeds externalgoods ifit is to attainto theevocativebut
- EN 1100b25etpassim).Andthis
obscurestatusof'blessed'(¿iccmpioç
isunhelpful.
Foreither
itisbetter
tobeblessedthantobe happy,inwhich
casewe oughtproperly
tohaveinviewtheoneandnottheotheras our
ultimateend (and theoriginalproblemwithhappinessnow arisesfor
oritis notbettertobe blessedthantobe happy,inwhich
blessedness),
caseitisunclearwhyoneshouldwanttobe blessed.(Indeeditis unclear
in preciselythesensethatit is unclearwhyone shouldwantexternal
goodsifhavingthemdoes notmakefora betterlife,whichis ofcourse
thequestioninresponsetowhichthecategory
of'blessedness'was first
introduced.)
I agreewithJuliaAnnasthatclaims(1) and (2) oughttobe regarded
as an attempt
toclarify
andstabilizeAristotle's
position8
(thoughI think
sheis wrongabouthow theStoicsthinkitoughttobe revised).Now it
seemstomethatanysuchattempt
cansucceedonlyifitdoesnotsimply
cordonoffvirtueon theonehandand external
goodson theother,and
declareforeacha separatesenseof'good' and a corresponding
senseof
For
from
this
the
of
the
relation
of
the
two
sorts
ofgood
'happy'.
problem
arises.
We
would
be
left
with
a
version
and
an
not
of,
inevitably
improvementupon,Aristotle's
solutionto theproblem(indeed,theStoicswere
I think- offailingsufficiently
oftenaccused- unfairly,
todistinguish
in thisrespect[cf.e.g.,de Fin TV11-13,43;
themselves
fromAristotle
Commnot1071B-C]).Therightapproachwillinsteadderivebothclaims
(1) and (2) froma singleaccountofactions- onewhichshowsthemto
have bothvirtueand externalgoods in view,but in such a way that
successwithregardto theone is necessaryforthesuccessof a given
action,whilesuccesswithregardtotheotheris not.
Theclaimofthispaperis thatwhatI havecalled'therightapproach'
is, indeed,theStoicapproach.I shalltry,in whatfollows,to give an
accountofit.

8 I do notclaim,nordoesAnnas,thattheStoicstookthemselves
tobe responding
to
inparticular.
Aristotle
Theymaysimplyhavehadinminda positionsimilartohis;
ortheymayhavebeenthinking
ofa positiondevelopedbyAristotle's
followers.
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160 Ian Blecher

2
A popular sortofintroductionto theStoicconceptionofvirtuetakesthe
formofan analogybetweenvirtueand some setofeverydaydoings.The
following drawn by several Stoics,beginningwith Antipaterin the
thirdcenturyBC9is perhaps thebest-knownexample:
a spearor arrowat
Justas a manwhosetaskitis to shoot(conliniare)
in hispowerto
do
as
his
ultimate
to
end,
has,
something
everything
endinlife.In the
shootstraight,
so itis withwhatwe calltheultimate
thathe mustdo all he can;
case (ofthearcher),itis to shootstraight
it is to do all he can to dischargethetask(ofshooting
nonetheless,
thatis (really)hisultimate
end.So itis withwhatwe callthe
straight)
in
But
hit
life.
to
is,as we say,tobe "selected"
something
supremegood
not"sought",(deFinIII 22;cf.Stob5b3,6a-c;Commnot1071B-D.)
The manuscript has perhaps been corrupted somewhat,10and
dense here (perhaps in an attempt
Cicero's Latin is uncharacteristically
to ape thestyleofStoicdialectic[cf.deFin Hl 19]). The idea seems in any
theultimateend fora givenarcheris notthata given
case to be this:first,
rather
his ultimateend is thathe do thethingsrequiredof
be
target hit;
him by thetaskin theappropriateway. And second, someone tryingto
be virtuousis like our archerin thisrespect.
The analogy has neverfaredwell outside theStoa. Posidonius is said
to have thoughtit contained 'a manifestinconsistencyand nothing
honorableor productiveof happiness' (fr.187; LS 1, 405). Alexanderof
Aphrodisiascalled it 'absurd' (deAn II 164.6;LS 1, 401). And, of course,
thereis Plutarch'scanonical objection:
inhispowernotfor
Ifsomeoneweretosaythatarcherdoeseverything
inhis
butforthesakeofdoingeverything
thetarget
thesakeofhitting
in
and
fantastic
him
to
be
would
one
riddling
speaking
suppose
power,
way.So itis withtheidiotswhoinsistthattheendofaimingat things
butthetakingandselecting
withnatureisnotthegetting
inaccordance
is noteachman'sendinhisdesireand
ofthem,and thatbeinghealthy

Cf.also
aboutitsorigin.
9 Annas1993,402.Striker
1996,310givesanother
suggestion
1976,82.
Alpers-Gölz
10 Butcf.LS 2,398.
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butonthecontrary
hasreference
tothe
pursuitofhealth,
beinghealthy
desireandpursuitofbeinghealthy.
what
For
is thedifference
between
someone'ssayingthathealthhascomeintobeingforthesakeofdrugs,
notdrugsforthesakeofhealth,and one who makestheselectionof
and use morechoiceworthy
thanhealth,
drugsand theircomposition
orrather
at all,butlocatestheend
regardshealthas notchoiceworthy
in activity
thedrugs,and declaresdesireto be theend of
concerning
thegetting,
notthegetting
theendofthedesire?(Commnot1071Fff.)

Letus setaside,forthemoment,
hisindecorouslackofsympathy
for
and
observe
how
Plutarch
the
into
end
of
focus.
The
it,
brings analogy
thearcher- 'thatthetaskbe completedin theappropriate
way' is
glossedhere in termsof the practiceof an art.And I thinkthisis
Forthestandards
athitting
appropriate.11
bywhichevena failedattempt
thetargetcouldcountas a kindofsuccesscouldonlyhave comefrom
theirsatisfying
thestandardsofa generalpracticeoftarget-hitting
(that,
forexample,one assumedtheproperobliquestance,nockedthearrow
at a rightangle,tookaccountof thewind,releasedsmoothly...But
notonlytohitthetarget,
butalso eventotryto
imaginesomeonefailing
do anyofthesethings.Underwhatcircumstances
wouldwe saysucha
did hisbesttohitthetarget?).
personnevertheless
So Plutarchhas theanalogyright;he onlythinksit absurdthatthe
ultimate
end ofarchersis notthattargets
be hit,butratherthatarchery
be practiced
as
it
would
be
absurdtosupposethatthe
appropriately
ultimate
endofdoctorsis thatmedicinebe practiced
and
appropriately,
notthattheirpatients'healthimprove.
Contemporary
scholarshiphas largelyfollowedPlutarchin this,
it
has
refined
hiscomplaints
somewhat.Itis nowadayssaid that
though
Stoicdogmaentails,disastrously,
thatarchery
is - and archers,
theretohitting
thatthestandardsby
fore,oughttobe indifferent
targets;12
whicharchersactuallyjudgetheirown performances
are notthoseby

11 Cf.Alpers-Gölz:
'Herethemeaning
of"conliniare"
isimportant:
itssignificance
does
notresidemerely
inthestraightforward
aimofhitting
thetarget,
butrather
inthe
- thesurehandedness,
thatis,whichsignifies
themastery
of
"aimingaccurately"
theart../(1976,81; my[somewhat
TherelevanceofAlpersliberal]translation).
Gölz'smarvellous
booktothispaperwasbrought
tomyattention
byananonymous
referee.
12 See,forexampleAnnas1993,402.
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162 Ian Blecher

thatarchery
whichtheyoughttobe judged;13
musthavebeeninvented
forthesakeofshootingarrows.14
thattheStoicswereaware
Itis sometimes
added,as ifintheirdefense,
and manymorebesides;
of,and happyto accept,theseconsequences,
aboutsuch
that,in theirview,theskepticneedsto revisehisintuitions
- indeedwouldrevisethem,ifonlyherealizedthesignificance
matters
ofvirtue.15
Theanalogywitharchery
Suchconsiderations
seemtomeconfused.
and scopeofvirtuein
was supposedto helpus realizethesignificance
thefirstplace - so it isn'tmuchgood to requireus alreadyto have
realizedthemin orderto grasptheanalogy.Norwilla further
analogy
Forthe
havingbeensuggested16).
help(sportsandacting,
amongothers,
could
it
be
a
successful
to
which
would
criteria
only
analogy
according
butthatconception
ofvirtue;
havebeensuppliedbya correct
conception
was supposedto havebeen supplied(in part,at least)by theanalogy
witharchery.17
about- andthispaperis addressed
Iftheanalogyis worthbothering
to thosewho thinkit is - thiscan onlybe because it can supply
ofvirtue.
Thiswillbe possibleunder
witha correct
non-Stoics
conception
it
must
not
two conditions:
first,
presupposeany priorphilosophical
oftheanalogymust
toStoicdoctrines.
commitments
Anyinterpretation
was
that
default
therefore
the
view,
archery designedin orderto
grant
hittargets.
It is notas ifthisis someunexamined
prejudice:thegoal of
of
the
the
source
ispretty
unityofthe
systematic
obviously
target-hitting
the
as
activities
such
diverse
art(cf.SVF173).How elseshould
checking
around
and
a bow-string carrying
ofthewindand tightening
direction
a quivercometobe essentialpartsofthesamesetofdoings?

13 See, forexample Cooper 1999,438.
14 See, forexample Striker1996,243,307,309.
15 See Annas 1993,399,410.
16 By Striker1996,245,310 (but cf.Annas 402n.,fora replyto this)and Cooper 1999,
348 respectively.
17 Of course the Stoics did draw an analogy between actingand virtue(see de Fin HI
24f.).But thatanalogy was not,it seems to me, intendedto explain how claims (1)
and (2) may be held simultaneously.I considerwhat it was intendedto explain in
§4 below.
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Andsecond,itmustbe madeclearwhytheanalogywe aretoconsider
is witharchery,
and notjustanyart- geometry
or sculpture,
say.We
ifwe conclude,with
shouldtakeourselvesto have missedsomething
Annas,amongothers(1993,400-2;cf.White1990,n.36),thattheanalogy
is meantonlytoalertus toa similarity
betweenvirtueandtheotherarts:
so muchis alreadyclearfromtheStoicdefinition
ofvirtueas the'xé%vr|
Tovßiov'thatis,theartofliving(AM XI 170,181,184).Virtuemust
Tiepi
therefore
cometo resemblearcheryin a way whichsetsbothofthem
from
otherarts.
apart
Inthefollowing
I shallexaminehowanunprejudiced
section,
conceptionofarchery
aboutaction.
nevertheless
conform
toStoicthought
might
In §4 1shallsuggestwhata conception
ofvirtueanalogoustothismight
looklike.Withthisinplace,itshouldbe easiertoseehowclaims(1) and
I shallconcludebyconsidering,
in§5,
(2) mightbe heldsimultaneously.
an objection
totheuseI thinktheStoicswishtomakeoftheanalogywith
archery.
3

Take theclaimthatsomeone,giventhetaskofhitting
with
something
an arrow,wouldnottrytohitthetarget,
butrathertopracticea certain
artappropriately.
Gisela Striker
has suggestedthatwe may suppose
therearepeopleso motivated,
inasmuchas practically
anymotivation
fordoing anythingwill have its hour withsomeone('I am voting
becauseChristdesiresitofme...') . But,shesays,forthisvery
Republican
reasonthebareexistence
ofsomeoneso motivated
tellsus nothing
about
theproperattitude
towardthegood.Whatwe wanttoknowis whether
itis rightto tryand practicearchery
properlygiventhetaskofhitting
with
an
not
whether
thereexistssomeonewhowould
arrow,
something
so try.Thepointoftheanalogy,sheconcludes,mustactuallyhavebeen
togeneralize
abouttheendofarchery
as such.18
TheclaimtheStoicswant
us toconsiderwouldthenbe:
is thatarchery
be practicedappropriately.
(A) Theendofarchery

18 Striker
1996,243,306;a similarviewcanbe foundinAnnas1993,400ff.
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And,Striker
concludes,thisis moreorlessfatuous.Foritwas widely
thatartsmustdiffer
fromtheobjects
agreedamongancient
philosophers
forwhichtheyare practiced(theclaimseemsto have originated
with
Evenifthisis not,
cf.Striker
Carneades;see deFinV 16ff.;
1996,311ff.).
does seemtobe oneoftheclassofartsso
strictly
speakingtrue,archery
virtueis
conceived(cf.Striker
Whereas,presumably,
1996,245,311ff.).
in (A) yieldsa claimwe can take
not:substituting
Virtue'for'archery'
Butitis notas thought
theanalogywitharchery
helpedus to
seriously.
see this:itseemedrather
togetin theway.
Now itis perhapspeculiarthata readingwhichmakestheanalogy
fatuousshould have recommended
itselfto Strikerover one which
Butletus considerwhether
thesereallyare
makesitlookmerelytrivial.
theonlyalternatives.
Now certainly
theissuecannotbe whethersome
givena bow and arrows
particular
personmighttrytopracticearchery,
and somethingto hit.But why suppose we are speakinghere of a
particularperson,the detailsof whose biographyhave simplybeen
thatwe wanttoknow
elidedforconvenience's
sake?Isn'ttheidearather
whata humanbeingwoulddo here?Itis as ifwe had asked:whatwould
to
a misunderstanding
a catdo givena saucerofmilk?Itwouldreflect
we
want
in
a
In
this
Tibbies
detests
saucer'.
example,
anything
reply:'My
toknowaboutthenatureofcats- notaboutTibbies.In thecase ofthe
archerwe want,analogously,
toknowwhether
with
(A') A given(goodexampleofa) man,askedtohitsomething
a bow and arrows,wouldtrytopracticearchery.
humannature,and notjustwhetherit accucharacterizes
accurately
ofanyactualpersons.
thedisposition
ratelycharacterizes
in a
Now itsurelyisn'tfatuousto saya manwouldpracticearchery
to do so (as it
noris ittrivialto describehimas trying
givensituation;
towalk
maybe todescribesomeonewalkingdownthestreetas 'trying
in theright
down thestreet').Forhe maywell failto practicearchery
thisis notan easythingto
wayevenifhe is good at it:itis understood
do (perhapsonlySocratesand Cato theYoungerwereup to it ...). We
evenifitturnsoutto
seemtohavea claimwhichwe cantakeseriously,
be false.
is an end for
Theclaimcan also be putthisway:to practicearchery
our man because of whathe is, and because of whatarcheryis, and
becauseofwhathistaskis,and notbecausehe justwantsto (he is not
a claimabouttheexplanaItis therefore
a brandofdetergent).
selecting
sort.Ifwe wanttoknowwhya man
tionofhumanactionsoftherelevant
sometask,we cannotalways,andbecause
actsas hedoesuponreceiving
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notalways,cannotultimately
advertto a supposeddesirethatthetask
be accomplished.
We mustcitea practice.
Whyshouldthisbe?Letus imaginesomeonewhoseactionsvís-à-vís
more.Forsuch
a giventargetall reflect
theendthatitbe hitandnothing
that
a person,practicing
but
the
means
to
end.Perhaps
here
is
archery
we maysay,is themeans
thissoundslikea truismaboutarts:cobbling,
ofproducingshoes,gunsmithing
themeansofproducingguns,geometrythemeansofbissecting
angles... Butherewe mustnotea peculiarity
ofarchery
So longas all he wants
(and theso-called'stochastic'
arts19).
is thata pairofshoesbe made,a cobblerhasno reasontotryandachieve
he
his end by anymethodotherthancobbling.Ifhe cobblescorrectly,
willsucceed.Successwitharchery
a
matter
of
is,however,
probability.
In certain
willstanda better
chanceoflandingtheirarrow
cases,archers
witha methodotherthanarchery.
Itmaybe preferable,
forexample,to
throwthearrowat thetargetrather
thantoshootit,ortowalkup tothe
targetand shoveitintothebull'seye.Or,we mayimaginethetargetis
chanceof
beingguardedin sucha way thatthereis onlytheslimmest
it
that
an
means
of
but
there
is
hittingby
archery;
extremely
goodchance
ofhitting
itifone bribestheguardto shovean arrowintoit.Here,we
shouldsay,theend thatthetargetbe hitdemandsthattheguardbe
bribed.
Now practicing
is nottheanswertoeveryprobleminvolving
archery
arrows('I wantyouto fashiona duckdecoyfromthis').ButI thinkwe
shallsayourarcherhas misunderstood
histaskifhe decideson bribery
- thathehasbehavedunsportingly,
perhaps;orthathehas,bypermitrid
himself
this
himself
ofthetaskwithout
short-cut,
ting
merely
actually
it.
But
do
we
feel
this
accomplishing why
way?Our archerwill,afterall,
havebroughtitaboutthat,bymeansofa bow and arrow,thetargetis
hit.Whyshouldn'tthiscountas success?
Theproblemcomesintofocus,I think,
ifwe arrangeforourarcher's
financial
straitstobe suchthatthemoneyrequiredforthebribecould
onlybe raisedby thesale ofhis bow. Now, as longas theend ofour
archer(as such)is simplythatthistargetbe hit,therewillbe no reason
forhimnotto go ahead withthebribe.Fortherationality
oftakingthe
meansto an end is unaffected
considerations
about
one's
by
abilityto

19 Arts,thatis,whosesuccessful
iscompatible
withthefailure
toproduce
performance
theend.Medicineandnavigation
arethestandardexamples.
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realizelikeendsinthesequelunlessthoseendsarealreadyinview.And,
butthe
theyarenot- ourarcherhas as hisendnothing
byhypothesis,
if
want
hit
ever
bow
to
of
this
'You'll
need
targets
your
you
hitting
target.
to
inert.
him,
is,
again'
Fromthiswe shouldconcludethatwe do not thinkour archer's
a particular
ultimateend hitting
target.Butwhatis hisend ifnotthis?
TheStoicssay- plausibly,in myview- itis thatthetargetbe hit'in
theStoictermof
therightway [certo
quodam,
genere
possiblyrendering
Fin
not
however
one
likes
art,KccOriKÓVTCoç]
{de III 23-4).Here
[quolibet]'
theLatin
we aretold'in therightway' means'consistently'
(translating
theGreek'o^ioXoyia
itselftranslating
convenienta,
[deFinIII 22]).Thisis,
one.To
a peculiargloss.ButI thinktheclaimis an intuitive
obviously,
be concerned
notjustforthetarget's
beinghitbutalso forthewaythis
- thatis tosaygeneralforthe'consistent'
is doneis tobe concerned
cases.Ofcourse,
methodoftarget-hitting
beingdeployedin particular
fleet-footed
archers
face
vicissitudes
the
(wind,
quarry,hostile
given
could
no
method
for
guaranteesuccessin
hittingtargets
guards...),
art.
that
what
it
means
This
is
instance.
archeryis a stochastic
every
of
number
maximize
the
a
method
to
devise
we
can
Nevertheless,
thebodyofpractical
successesoverall- viz.,byorganizing
knowledge
withthisinview(cf.SVFII 93-97;deFinIII 50;Allen
abouttarget-hitting
1993,89).
is in place,thenevenwherebribingthe
Oncethemethodofarchery
todo things
andwheretrying
guardisthesurestwaytohita giventarget,
reasonto
is
still
there
make
success
would
unlikely,
terrifically
properly
- then,indeed,foroneinthepositionofourarcher,
makea goofarchery
bribingsomeoneto shovean arrowintothetargetcouldnotcountas
is to be
successat all. For now a particularattemptat target-hitting
at
fare
would
the
method
how
hittingtargets
employed
judged by
Andthisis justto saythatitis tobe judgedbythestandards
generally.
ofarchery.20
tohittheparticular
Thisdoes notmeanthatourarcheris nottrying
if
be
of
not
that
he
should
or
it, he does (so longas
glad hitting
target,

20 I am notclaimingarchery(along withtheotherstochasticarts)is tobe distinguished
fromnon-stochasticartsin thisrespect;only thatthe generalaim of artsas such is
broughtout most clearlyin the case of the stochasticarts,since fornon-stochastic
artiststhereis never a conflictbetween the end in a particularcase and the end in
general.
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'glad' does not standforany emotionalresponse.But a meaningful
discussionoftheStoictheoryofemotionsherewould be out ofplace
tohititbymeans
tohithistarget- trying
here).Obviouslyhe istrying
success.But
ofarchery;
and tothisextenthe maybe gladofa particular
what our archerdoes in orderto hit a particulartargetcannotbe
case.Ifwe want
explainedintermsoftheendofsuccessinthatparticular
hisactions
tounderstand
whathe is doing,we willhavetounderstand
- interms,
intermsofthegeneralpractice
thatis,ofthe
oftarget-hitting
artofarchery.
4

I havenotcharacterized
theStoicaccountofthearcherin a waywhich
itfromotherancientconceptions
ofart(cf.Allen1993,89;
distinguishes
he cites,in thisconnection,
Phœdr
269d-e,272a-b;Rhet1355blO-ll;Top
101b5-10).And thiswas preciselythe aim: to approachthe analogy
withoutpriorcommitment
to a theoryof virtue,so thatit mightbe
understoodas an appeal to theuninitiated.
Now we have to see what
theappealis.
Itcanbe putstraightforwardly:
virtue,as theStoicsunderstand
it,is
an artstructurally
similartoarchery.
Let us therefore
task(ofa sortI am aboutto
say:givena particular
a
man
of
has
reason
totrytobe virtuous,
and
a)
specify),(goodexample
notto tryto accomplishthetask.Assumingtheanalogyholds,itmay
wellturnoutina lotofcasesthattrying
tobe virtuouswillresultinthe
task'sbeingaccomplished;
but,incertaincases,a choicewillhavetobe
made in favorofpracticing
virtueand againsta methodmuchmore
to
the
task.
likely accomplish
Now thesortoftasktheStoicsmusthaveinmindhereis thatwhich
is givento a maninvirtueofhisbeinghuman:thetaskofattaining
the
so-calledprimary
to
Fin
III
nature
naturae
de
thingsaccording
(prima
II
DL
mía
VII
Stob
105
et
16ff.;
6a;
7ipoT|Y|iéva cpúaiv
passim) of
in
other
those
which
his
animal
needs
words,
attaining,
goods
satisfy
and desires.Thoughitis perhapssurprising
claim
(1) above,the
given
Stoicsneverclaimedthatitis pointlessorwickedtopursuesuchthings,
as thoughtheywerea distraction
fromtherealworkofcultivating
virtue;
on thecontrary,
theyregardedpursuitofthemas a necessarypartof
whatitis toliveas a humanbeing(cf.deTinIII 39).
'Everyanimal,as soonas itis born,'Cicero'sCatosays,
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withitself,
is concerned
and takescareto preserveitself.It favorsits
andwhatever
constitution
itsconstitution,
whereasitrecoils
preserves
fromitsdestruction
and whatever
to
appears promoteitsdestruction.
In supportofthisthesis,theStoicspointoutthatinfants
seekwhatis
goodforthemandavoidtheoppositebeforetheyeverfeelpleasureor
pain.Thiswouldnothappenunlesstheyvaluedtheirownconstitution
Butneithercouldit happenthattheywould
and feareddestruction.
at all unlesstheyhad self-awareness
selfseekanything
and thereby
love.So one mustrealizethatitis self-love
thatprovidestheprimary
motivation,
(deFinIII 16;cf.Ep 121,DL VII 85)
Now the claim of the analogy can be put thisway: with a particular
opportunityofpromotingthemaintenanceofone's constitutionin view
- thatis to say,
given the opportunityto act one always has reason
to practicevirtue,and not to seize the opportunityby whatevermeans
happen to be most convenient.And indeed, this is what childrenwho
are broughtup properlylearn,theStoics say.
Hence Cicero's Cato:
is to
action"(bywhichI translate
Theinitial"appropriate
"kcc&tìkov")
what
in
natural
constitution.
The
next
is
to
take
oneself
one's
preserve
is in accordancewithnatureand rejectitsopposite.Oncethismethod
then
hasbeendiscovered,
selection
ofselection
(andlikewiserejection)
bein
hand
with
action.
Then
such
selection
hand
appropriate
goes
nature.
in
with
stable
and
comescontinuous,
and,finally,
agreement
Atthispointthatwhichcantrulybe said tobe goodfirst
appearsand
forwhatitis. (deFinIII 20)
is recognized
The importofthispassage will come clearwhen we see whywe ought
not to ask, 'ifman's firstconcernforrationalityis a formof concernfor
himself,why should he come to completelyneglecthis animal nature?'
(Striker1996,288, see also 289; Engberg-Pedersen1986,145ff.).It is not
simply that the prospectsfora satisfyinganswer to this question are
bleak - thoughtheyare (see Striker1996,292). The question is simply
confused.
The suggestionis not at all thatan adult's interestin virtuesupplants
childhood concernswith externalgoods (as we may say an interestin
and Penthouse
TheNew Yorker
supplantsa childhoodinterestin Boy'sLife
and Mad). The suggestion is ratherthat over time a method for the
selection and rejectionof external goods takes shape. Prior to this,
selectionand rejectionstillhappened - only not methodically.That is
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to say,ithappenedwithouta viewto whatis good fora humanbeing
a life.But it is onlythe haphazardnesswhichhas to be
throughout
abandoned- notthe'animalnature'.
Partoftheupbringing
involveexplanations
ofa childwilltherefore
ofthesort,'Becauseifyougobbleup all theraisinsnowyouwon'thave
anywhenyouwantthemlater/and 'BecauseI wouldn'ttrustsomeone
who lies,'and 'Becauseitis impoliteand unsanitary
topickone'snose,
that'swhy.'And thisis because,thoughchildrendo not,accordingto
theStoicway of thinking,
need to learnto desireparticularexternal
do
need
to
learn
how theirparticular
actionsbearon their
goods,they
forsecuring
thosegoodsinthelongterm.Thisis surelynotto
prospects
learnthatsecuringthosegoodsis notimportant
at all. On thecontrary:
it is to learnthatthegreatestpossiblenumberof such goods can be
securedthroughout
a lifetime
onlybymeansofa generalmethod.And,
ofcourse,itis tolearnthatthepiecemealmeanschildren
(andCyrenaics)
use willmakethisharder- willlead,inthemostextreme
case,totheir
at
all.
unable
to
secure
Consider
the
being
anygoods
responseofXenoSocrates
to
that
view
one
phon's
Aristippus'
oughtalwaysand onlyto
do whatbringsimmediate
a
Such
pleasure.
person,Socratessays,would
not longbe able to gratify
himselfin thisway. He would soon find
himselfa slave to thosewho becamestrongby delayinggratification
(MemII 1 10-15;cf.Annas1993,227).
Andthisgeneralmethodis called'virtue'.Now theStoicclaimis that,
afterlearningthemethodofvirtue,onewillconcernoneselfmorewith
its employment
thanwithgettingtheparticularitemsto be selected.
Perhapsthissoundsimplausible- themethodis,afterall,a meansof
thoseitems(orso we maysuppose,anyway).Butitis
securing
precisely
We have to hearthe
by now,I hope,soundinga littlemorefamiliar.
concern
as
a
to
be
contrasted
witha concernfor
one,
appropriate
general
some
That
external
is
what
theanalogywith
getting
particular
good.
was
to
us.
teach
archery supposed
Thisdoes notmean,ofcourse,thatifI stopmyselfstealingthispear
fromthemarket,
I shallsomedayhavemanymorepears.Perhaps,after
notstealingthepear,I shallbe stabbedtodeathon thebus home.(Does
a greatlode ofpearscountalwaysas a good?We mustn't,
in anycase,
at
success
external
with
mere
accumulation
of
equate
securing
goods
wealth- perhapstoo manypearswould impedemysecuringhealth,
orgoodfriends,
or...) Thepointis,however,
a pointabouthowtojustify
whatI am doing:inlightofmyultimate
end- viz.,thatI lead a happy
life- myactionswouldbe atbestarbitrary
iftheywerenotdirectedat
the
share
of
external
a lifeas such
securing greatest
goods throughout
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ifI am after
(thoughperhaps,itmayturnout,notmylifeinparticular,
all stabbed).The securingofno (evenveryhigh)numberofparticular
whichthisendhas in view.
goodscouldattainto thesortofgenerality
withrespecttothegeneralis,
Thisincommensurability
oftheparticular
I think,
whatjustifies
valueofvirtue
theStoicclaimthat'theparticular
is distinct:
a matter
ofkind,notdegree'(deFinHI 34;see also in 39):the
pointis notthatthenumberofgoodsobtainedbe absolutelyhigh,but
thatitbe as highas possible,
whetheror notwhatis possibleis actually
verymuch.
if we are to understandthe actionsof someone
And, conversely,
- hisabstaining
virtuous
fromfoodanddrinknowand then,hisgiving
awayhismoneytothepoor,hiswearingtheoccasionalbeardofbeeswe mustunderstand
themas directedat theultimateaim ofsecuring
a life(as such)and notofsecuring,
external
say,this
goodsthroughout
now.
for
pear, him,
claims(1) and (2).To saythatvirtueis thesolegood
Hereletus revisit
I
as
to
that
virtueand nothingelse makesfora happylife.
is,
said, say
Itcannotbe a contingent
Butwhythink
thisa severeandjoylessdoctrine?
factaboutvirtuethatitis a meansofdecidingwhichexternalgoodsto
to be exvalue' weresome separatematter,
pursue,as ifits 'intrinsic
virtue
On thecontrary:
plainedbyitspossessionofwondrousabstracta.
it- wouldbe no morethanHegel's
wouldhavenothing
torecommend
- ifitweresecond-best
as a practical
in thought'
'freedom
contentless
alternabutmoreefficient
method;ifthereweresomeotherlesspretty
The
tutored.
be
tivemethodin theapplicationofwhichchildren
might
the
benefits
of
I
and
both
extrinsic
which
mean
intrinsic)
practical(by
from
are
virtuouslife(as conceivedbytheStoics,anyway), inseparable
it.Iftheywerenot,itwouldbe hardtoseehowvirtuealonecouldmake
a personhappy.
thatclaim(1) is designedtoencompass
I thinkwe cansay,therefore,
countedvaluable- bothvirtues
all thosepartsoflifewhichAristotle
and theirearthly
rewards butin sucha way thatno questionabout
whichhavesometimes
needeverarise.Thecasesofconflict
theirrelation
been emphasizedhere(shallI save theorphanageor buy a quitenice
ends
notbetweendistinct
mustcometobe regardedas conflicts
pen?)21
theselfsameend.This
or impulses,butbetweenmethodsofsatisfying

21 See forexample Inwood 1985,210ff.He cites,in thisconnection,Ep 76.18.
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does - tobeginbyexplaining
requiresus not- as Aristotle
evidently
whatthevirtuesare,and thenconsidering
whatothersortsof goods
a numberof
theremightbe; or- as Aristotle
also does- todistinguish
and
to
the
then
to
uncover
their
relative
import
happylife.
goods,
try
oftheaccount,as
Virtuemustratherbe conceived,fromthebeginning
fromall questionsaboutthegood,whichincludesquestions
inseparable
about thevalue of externalgoods. And thisis a consequenceof the
whichI thinktheStoicBildungstheorie
invitesus tohave.For
conception
to
virtue
is
art
of
selection
the
it,
according
just
amongexternal
goods.
Butifclaim(1) alreadygivesa fullaccounting
between
oftherelation
virtueandexternal
goods,whatis thepurposeofclaim(2),theclaimthat
we shouldrecall
some
mere
Here,I think,
securing
thingsis preferable?
theanalogywitharchery.
is topracticing
his
Our archer'scommitment
I
not
that
he
is
to
his
but
that
does
not
as
art,
mean, said,
hitting target;
- orthathewouldnotbe atall
notinsomesensetrying
tohitthetarget
ina particular
a particular
human
instance.
gladofsucceeding
Similarly,
actionis,insomesense,an attempt
tosecurea particular
external
good;
and itis hardto see whythevirtuousagentshouldnotbe glad ofthis
justbecausehehasprudently
deployeda methodofactingdesignedfor
and
not
for
success.
general,
particular,
Giventhewaythingsgo,themethodwillofcoursesometimes
require
us to choosecoursesofactionless likelyto secureanyexternal
good at
all than,say,simplystealingthepear;butfailureinthisregardis merely
trivialiftheoverallshareofgoodsis increasedmorebytheemployment
ofa methodwhichinthiscasefailstosecuretherelevant
good.Thepoint
ofclaim(2) is therefore
notto giveus a way to thinkabouttherelation
ofvirtuetoexternal
togiveus a waytothinkaboutthe
goods,butrather
relationofparticular
actions(and theirparticular
ends)to ourgeneral
methodofliving(and itsultimate
end).Andtheclaimis: thesuccessof
theformer
mustbe judgedby thelightsofthelatter- by whetherit
a consistent
manifests
andnotwhether
itsecuressomeparticumethod,
lar externalgood. For in the case of virtue,as withstochasticarts
willsometimes
thesecriteria
comeapart.
generally,
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5

meantto
Theclaimofanalogybetweenvirtueand archery
was,I think,
In Aristotle's
be controversial.
viewsomeonewhoapproachedpractical
mattesthewayan artistapproacheshisartwouldmisswhatis distinctiveaboutvirtuousactions:thatthereisnoitemwhichtheyaimtosecure
Theirendis simplythattheybe done.
(EN 1140al-23;1140b20-30).
between
This is, in otherwords,to take seriouslythe dzsanalogy
I
in
and
above:
we
resist
virtue
adumbrated
§2
archery
is thatarchery
be practicedappropriately,
(A) Theendofarchery
in a waywe do notresist
(V) Theendofvirtueis thatvirtuebe practicedappropriately.
I shall
Now if (V) is thelast word on the subject- a possibility
- itis clearthatouroriginalproblem,
theproblem
considerina moment
arises.Forif
abouttherelationofvirtueto externalgoods,inevitably
own
their
virtuousactionsdo notaimatanything
performance,
beyond
wealthand
a fullaccountof themcan be givenwithoutmentioning
healthand renown.Thevalueofitemsofthelattersort- ifindeedthey
And hereis
are valuable- willthenhave to be made out separately.
Ifso,
in
themselves?
valuable
areexternal
wherethingsgetsticky:
goods
relation
but
how
is
the
from
are
a
kind
of
distinct
virtue;
they
good
betweenthissortofgood and virtueto be made out?Or: are external
forvirtuousactions?Suppose,
goodsvaluableas thematerialcondition
however,we shouldfailto securethem.Wouldvirtuousaction- and
no one amongthe
therefore
Certainly
happiness- thenbe impossible?
ancientswas willingto say this.Or: are externalgoodsnotvaluableat
toothers!
all?Butsurelysomesuchthingsarepreferable
is meantto resistthis
One mightsupposetheanalogywitharchery
and to embraceinsteadone whichmakesconcisethe
lineofthought,
ofa methodofsecuring
relation
ofvirtuetoexternal
goodsas therelation
secured.
to
the
items
something
Thetroubleis,though,theStoicsdid notresist(V). On thecontrary,
thatvirtuousactionis
intuition
theysharedto someextentAristotle's
'Nor do we thinkwisdomis likenavigationor
valuableintrinsically:
morelikeactingordancing... [For]thedesiredend
butrather
medicine,
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is locatedwithinthe[virtuous]act/Cicero'sCato says,justtwoparatheanalogywitharchery
(deFinIII 24,S222).23
graphsafterpresenting
Whatmightwe makeofthis?It seemstome therearetwoquestions
here.Thereis a questionaboutwhatto makeofCato's assertionthat
ormedicine- orpresumably
wisdomisnotlikenavigation
anystochasticart- giventhetextwhichprecedesit.Andthereis a questionabout
whatto makeoftheassertionthatwisdomis likedancing.Letus take
theminturn.
As regardsthefirstquestion:JohnCooperhas said thepassagewas
debate(cf.1999,
bothsidesofan intestine
Verylikely'intendedtoreport
thereis no
438n).Now,itis possiblesucha debatetookplace.But,first,
evidenceto suggestCicerowas awareofone. And second,evenifhe
inwhat
was,itwouldhardlyexplainthestraightforward
inconsistency
a
of
the
nature
of
virtue
to
be
account
especiallygiven
purports
single
theviewsofdifferent
sectswithin
Cicero'scaretodistinguish
explicitly
III
de
Fin
theschoolswhoseviewsheconsiders(cf.
33).Perhapsitwould
be betterto say something
likethis:Cato is claimingsimplythatvirtue
is in somerespectdifferent
fromthestochastic
arts,thoughofcourse
atIII 22.ThisnotwhatCatoactually
therearethesimilarities
mentioned
and
thenagain,whathe actuallysaysis intolerable,
says,unfortunately;
what
I am notsurehow else to getaroundit.24
that
it
is
then,
Suppose,
he meant.
Ifitis,we cansay,as regardsthesecondquestion,
thatthecomparison
withdanceis intendedtocomplement,
theaccountof
nottoundermine,
virtueI reproducedin §3 above.Whatwas missingfromthataccount
was evidently
an explanation
oftheintrinsic
worthofvirtuousactions:
is derivedfromthevalue of
foritseemsthevalue oftheartofarchery

22 III 32 is bracketed
toitscontext.
bytheOxfordClassicalTexteditionas irrelevant
Annashelpfully
suggestsitwouldfitwellwithIII 24,andwiththisinmind,I have
runthetwopassagestogether.
23 Strictly
ofcourse,Catodoesnotbackdownfromtheclaimthatvirtueis
speaking,
an arthere(orelsewhere).Buthe mayas well have:it is no longerclearwhyit
matters
thatwe areregarding
virtueas an art,and notas a suigeneris
of
property
actionswhichnevertheless
sharessomething
withdancing.
24 Itisalwaysopentous tospeculate
aboutthecorruption
ofthemanuscript,
ofcourse;
butsuchspeculation,
butphilosophical
basedon nothing
seemsto
bewilderment,
meunnecessarily
here.
desperate
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thegreatest
butwe shouldnotliketo
hitting
possiblenumberoftargets;
saythatthevalueoftheartoflivingis derivedfromthevalueofsecuring
external
goods- eventhevalueofsecuringthegreatest
possiblenumber of them- or,really,thatit is derivedfromanything
to whichit
I takeCatotobe claiming,
wouldthenbe a means.In thisrespect,
virtue
is like dancing(and unlikearchery):the value of the actionwhich
manifests
the propermethodof selectionis whollycontainedin its
performance.
oftheanalogywitharchery.
Perhapsthissoundslikea repudiation
ButI do notthinkitis. Thepointofthatanalogywas toalertus tosome
structural
whichvirtue,
understood
as themethodofselecpeculiarities
tionofexternal
with
shares
stochastic
arts
goods,
(e.g.,itsdemandthat
in favorof
an
in
a
external
case
be
sacrificed
particular
securing
good
successoverall).Butthiswas a pointabouttherelationofvirtueto the
choiceofparticular
actions,nota pointabouttherelationofa particular
virtuousactionto thevirtuouslifeas a whole.25
Thislatterrelationis
no
fromthe former.For
choiceever need be made
quite different
betweenbeingvirtuoushieetnuncandbeingvirtuousthroughout
life.
The one is just a partof theother.Butpreciselybecause a particular
virtuousactionis a partofthevirtuouslife,we do notsay theone is a
meansto theother(as we do notnormally
say thatthepas de deux at
ofLe Corsaire).
theendofActI is a meanstotheperformance
consistsinitsbeing
Theintrinsic
valueofthevirtuouslifeapparently
- nota meansto,butidenticalwith- thehappylife,wherehappiness
valuable(cf.EN 1097a35-b7).
is understood
as absolutely
So,we cansay,
virtuousactionconsistsinitsbeingtheintrinsic
valueofa particular
nota meansto,butidenticalwith- a partofthehappylife.
Butthisis perfectly
withtheaccountof§3 above;thereis
compatible
virtuousactionscouldnotbeartherelationto the
no reasonparticular
virtuouslifeas a wholewhichtheanalogywithdancesuggestsand still
be thebestmethodofselectionamongexternalgoods.All thiswould
mean is thatto practicethatmethodis to lead a happylife(and the
converse).Thereis no reasonwhythevalue of virtueshouldnotbe
ofexternalgoods
withtherelationitbearsto theaccretion
compatible

25 Hence Inwood rightlyspeaks of the 'limitedaims of the author of this analogy',
1985,213.
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- so long,thatis,as we do notinferfromthisthatthevalueis derived
whatwe shall
fromthatrelation.
Butthis- I haveargued- is precisely
with
how (1) is compatible
haveunderstood
whenwe haveunderstood
(2).26
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